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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNETT, ) 
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Plaintiff ) CASE NO. 







and Respondent. ) 
. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
16268 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Charles N. Bennett, here-
inafter referred to as HUSBAND, herein petitions this Honor-
able Court for a rehearing on the Judgment rendered by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah on October 19, 1979, 
wherein this Honorable Court affirmed the Judgment of a 
lower District Court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision and findings 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the instant 
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action, by reason of the opinion by this Court on 




IN DIVISION OF ASSETS THE COURT CAN CONSIDER ONLY 
SUCH ASSETS AS ARE VESTED IN THE APPELLANT AND 
CANNOT CONS IDER FUTURE RETIREMENT FUNDS THAT MAY 
BE PA ID TO APPELLANT AS RET IREr.fENT FUNDS WHICH ARE 
CONTINGENT, SPECULATIVE AND UNKNOWN. 
The issue which was submitted in the previous Brief of 
the Appellant to this Honorable Court, contained an issue 
which has never been decided by the Court, and which is a 
matter of great substance and import, and was not considered 
by this Honorable Court in the rendering of the decision and 
findings of the Court in its opinion of October 19, 1979. 
This Court stated in Paragraph 1 of its Opinion, the 
issue before the trial Court was whether or not the Court 
could take into consideration an accumulated retirement fund 
of about $15,000.00 which would not be payable to the Plain-
tiff until he retires, the Appellant presently being of the 
age of 49 years. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the issue 
before the Court was not as to whether or not the $15,000.00 
which had been earned and accumulated as retirement funds by 
the Appellant could be used in considering an equitable dis-
tribution of the property of the parties, in that the Appel-
2 
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lant had never raised that issue to the Court, and speci-
fically admits that the $15,681.95 which the Appellant had 
earned could and was properly considered by the Judge and 
taken into consideration in determining the assets of the 
marital estate. 
The issue before the Court was not whether or not the 
original $15,000.00 which had been accumulated and was pay-
able to the Plaintiff could be considered by the Court as an 
asset, but whether or not a sum of an additional $15,000.00 
which had not been accumulated and not accrued by the Appel-
lant and which could never vest in the Appellant nor be con-
sidered as funds additional to the original $15,000.00, but 
is only a bookkeeping process of the Federal Government in 
its setting up of a retirement fund and is in effect match-
ing funds of the federal government which never vests in the 
Appellant and could never become a part of the Estate of the 
Appellant unless: 
(1) The Appellant should be eligible for retirement; 
and 
(2) Survive to the age of retirement; and 
(3) Commenced to withdraw retirement funds; and 
(4) Use up first the accumulated monies which the 
Appellant had as earned retirement funds, which would be 
namely, the sum of $15,681.95; and 
(5) After to the use of the sum of $15,681.95, the 
. Appellant would then be drawing against general governmental 
3 
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funds, which funds at the inception of his retirement is an 
amount equal to his earned retirement funds, and the addi-
tional sum matched by the government to the Appellant's 
retirement funds would, after being used up, then be addi-
tionally supplemented from general funds of the retirement 
fund without any consideration of the actual earned retire-
ment funds of the Appellant. 
The testimony on Page 5 of Appellant's Brief quotes the 
retirement officer of Hill Air Force Base who stated: 
The husband would have exhausted what 
he's paid into the fund after he retires, 
in about 2 1/2, 3 years at the most. 
The Appellant's Brief sets forth on Page 4 thereof, the 
admission that the husband had an earned retirement fund in 
the amount of $15,681.95, which constituted the total deduc-
t ion made from the pay to the husband during the course of 
his employment at Hill Air Force Base. As to these funds 
there is no argument or contest by the Appellant that they 
are not vested funds and an admission by the Appellant that 
they should be considered as part of the retirement funds. 
The argument of the Appellant before this Court in its 
previous brief was, that the government matches the hus-
band 1 s $15, 681. 95 for bookkeeping purposes, with an addi-
tional sum of $15,581.95, or whatever funds may be in exist-
ence by the husband at the time he should elect retirement, 
and that these additional funds which the retirement funds 
sets up as a credit to the husband is a sum in addition to 
4 
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the earned sum which the Appellant would have at the time of 
retirement, and these additional funds are established by 
the retirement fund only for bookkeeping purposes, but at no 
time do these additional matching funds vest in the 
Appellant. 
If the Appellant should become demised, prior to 
retirement, the only funds that he or his estate would be 
entitled to, would be the funds which he earned and had 
vested in him, which is namely the amount he contributed in 
the sum of $15,681.95. The additional matching funds of the 
government are never vested in him, or could never be con-
sidered his property at any time as is illustrated by the 
dialogue between counsel and the retirement fund expert wit-
ness which stated as follows: 
Counsel: When is the earliest time he 
would be eligible to draw upon 
his· share and the Federal 
Governments shar~? 
Witness: Well, Sir, he really doesn't, 
he really doesn't draw from 
both. The amount of money he 
has in the retirement fund 
does not have any bearing on 
what he would get under 
retirement monthly annuity. 
The only value of what he has 
in the retirement fund is for 
Income Tax purposes or Dea th 
Benefits purposes. (T-76) 
In the instant matter before the Court, the issue 
before this Court is whether or not the Court can take into 
consideration the future retirement funds of the husband 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which are not accrued by him, and whether or not an amount 
of monthly retirement funds that he would draw, if he 
survived, after he has used up his earned retirement funds, 
are subject to be considered by the lower Court as an asset 
of the the estate and deducted from real assets as of the 
time of the divorce. 
In the instant matter before the lower Court, the Court 
took the sum of the retirement fund which had actually been 
earned by the Appellant at the time of the divorce, namely 
in the amount of $15,681.95, and awarded to the wife the sum 
of $30,000.00 to equal the Appellant's retirement funds when 
only $15,681.95 was vested in the Appellant and the addi-
tional amount up to $30,000.00 would be monies that he would 
receive only if he survived and retired and was able to use 
up his vested amount of $15,681.95, and then survived and 
was able to draw monthly retirement pay from that sum up to 
and including $30,000.00. 
This Court cited ~rig_!~!:.!. v. ~ng!~rt. 576 P.2d 1274 
(1978), Utah Supreme Court, in support of its opinion ren-
dered on October 19, 1979, and there is no disagreement as 
to that opinion, and the awarding by the lower Court of the 
vested funds of $15,681.95 as assets possessed by the 
parties. But surely this Court did not state in that case, 
nor intend that the future retirement pay of a party who is 
forty-nine (49) years of age would be considered and 
deducted from the current marital assets in an act ion of 
divorce. 
6 
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It is submitted to this Court that the matter that was 
appealed to this Court is a matter of great impact upon the 
divorce laws of the State of Utah, and upon the division of 
the assets and the estate of the parties seeking a divorce 
and a division of the assets of the martial estate that 
deals with contingent, unknown and speculative assets that 
are not yet vested in the husband at the time of the 
divorce, and there is no way in which that sum can be deter-
mined, nor should be determined, and this Court has continu-
ously held as in ~~~!~t! !~ ~ng!er!, iup£~. that a division 
of the marital state is based upon "all of the assets 
£oss~ss~~ by the parties". (Emphasis added) 
The lower Court understood that it was raising an issue 
that was new and that the case was worthy of appeal in that 
it had a vast and long-range effect in determining the 
assets of the parties in a divorce matter, and that the 
appeal by the Appellant to this Court was not of a frivolous 
nature. With the indulgence of the Court we will repeat 
again herein, the dialogue set forth on Page 7 of 
Appellant's Brief as follows: 
Mr. Vlahos: Your Honor, if I under-
stand your Honors posi-
t ion in reference to this 
$5,000.00 lien, it is 
based on some $15,ooo.oo 
Tnar f~~ _s:ov~rnmenr-fi~~ 
Tnaf fie can1 1 touch, has 
no- c-On t ror- over-.- has 
never--seen:- raTner tnan 
. Tiikiiig -wfiat The-parHes 
~an-~ave-!1g~f ~£~?------
7 
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Yes. That's taken into 
consideration. I want 
that understood, so that 
in case you do wantto 
appeaT;- ana nave--thaT 
~a T!~! .t~fff~, you- c an-ao 
so. 
In other words, you are 
basing it on the 
$15,000.00 he has no 
control over, can't 
touch, has never seen, 
and he can never get it. 
That he can only get if 
he lives long enough. 






I take it the $175.00 per 
child is based on his net 
income of $880.00. I 
think that is what the 
Court made a finding. 
Yes. (Emphasis added.) 
It is further submitted to the Court that the amount 
which the lower Court awarded as child support was excessive 
and inequitable and was based upon the same kind of bias as 
was evidenced by the Court in its creating a new concept of 
what constitutes the marital estate, thereby compelling the 
Appellant to appeal to this Court. The Court manifested a 
clear abuse of discretion that was determined by this Court 
in Mart iii.et t v. ~art!~~!!· 8 Ut.2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958), 
wherein this Court stated: 
8 
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If there is such a serious inequity as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, 
this court will make the modification 
necesary to bring about a just result. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that a divorce 
case is equitable in nature, and that this Court may review 
the evidence and substitute its Judgment for that of the 
trial court where it finds that in the division of property 
or the awards of alimony and child support, that the divi-
sion and award in the lower Court was unjust and inequitable 
and was an abuse of discretion. (Tso~!~~!~ v. !souf~~!~· 14 
Ut.2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963) 
If this Court finds that unknown, contingent and specu-
lative future retirement income of the spouse cannot be con-
sidered as an existing asset at the time of the decree of 
divorce, then it is submitted that there must be an entire 
revamping of the award made in the lower Court, in that the 
consideration by the lower Court of the sum of $30,000.00, 
instead of the actual retirement earned asset of the husband 
in the sum of $15,681.95 of the figure which was used in 
concluding the lien to be awarded to the husband as against 
the home, and that the Appellant would be entitled to at 
least the difference between the actual earned $15, 681. 95 
retirement fund and the $30,000.00 sum •vhich the Court used 
in its computations in considering the assets of the estate. 
9 
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POINT I I. 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF HEARING 
WITH THE RIGHT TO ORAL ARGUUENT IF REQUESTED. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Appel-
lant did not receive a notice of hearing in this entitled 
matter and did not have an opportunity to make a request for 
oral argument, and that such lack of notice of hearing is a 
deprivation of due process of law, in that the matter to be 
heard before this Court was of great import, not only to the 
present Appellant before the Court, but to all persons 
involved in matters of divorce in the future in the State of 
Utah, and that the Appellant was not given notice of hearing 
and have the right to oral argument, and had Appellant been 
given not ice, would have elected to present the true issues 
before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Appel-
lant is entitled to a rehearing with an opportunity to the 
Appellant to argue the specific issues before the Court, and 
in any event the opinion rendered by this Court of 
October 19, 1978 was not declaratory of the matter before 
the Court, and is of such great substance and import that 
this Court should grant a petition for rehearing, and allow 
argument before the Court on the original Brief of the 
10 
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Plaintiff and Respondent, and that the Appellant requests 
the opportunity of argument before the Court by this Pet i-
tion for rehearing, and respectfully requests the opportun-
ity to be allowed to argue the matter before this Court. 
Respectfully submitted by, 
VLAHOS, KNOWLTON & PERKINS 
BY .. (~·~.~~.°E.'.'",: ....... . 
PETE-N:-vt:iUioS:-..,.01=--=tfie-FTriii __ _ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
11 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l:i. 
I HEREBY CERT I FY that I ma i 1 ed on this ,;:; <i day of 
~t/f)_f{_, 1979, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Appellant's Brief, by posting same in the U.S. 
Mails, postage prepaid and addressed to the following 
counsel of record, to-wit: 
J. Val Roberts, Esq. 
P. O. Box 666 
Centerville, Utah 84104 
(Attorney for Respondent) 
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